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**Will They or Won't They: UN Peacekeeping
Deployment to Conflicts**

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REPORT

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Dedicated to my parents, who have provided tireless and unconditional support.

Will They or Won't They: UN Peacekeeping Deployment to Conflicts

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This report examines the trends in deployment of peacekeeping troops by the United Nations to conflict areas. I argue that the most important factor in the decision by the UN Security Council of whether or not to send troops is the state of the international system. When there is discord amongst the five permanent (P5) members of the UNSC, peacekeeping missions are significantly less likely. Relatedly, I argue that P5 discord makes individual members less likely to contribute to established missions. I test these and two secondary hypotheses using logit estimation and find support for two of the three hypotheses.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

What explains when and where UN peacekeepers are deployed? Burma, the longest running civil war in the international system, has spanned nearly 60 years and has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths. Meanwhile, the civil conflict in Ivory Coast in 2002 was relatively tame in comparison, lasting around six years and claiming slightly over 1,000 deaths. Surprisingly, the UN sent peacekeepers to Ivory Coast in 2004 but has yet to do so for Burma. Why did the UN send troops to a post-conflict zone that has suffered significantly less destruction and loss? These and other historical cases cast doubt on the conventional wisdom of peacekeepers being sent “where they are needed” and hint at other factors in the UN’s decision to deploy peacekeepers.

With the significant rise in the number of UN peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War, there has been a similarly significant rise in research [14, 1, 10, 11, 24] dedicated to answering the question of when peacekeeping missions do (and do not) get sent. A variety of theories have been put forth, from democracy promotion [1] to specific characteristics of the conflict [10, 11]. However, there is little empirical and theoretical consensus in the literature regarding peacekeeper deployment, suggesting that we still

know little about UN deployment trends and further analysis is needed.

This paper investigates the characteristics that influence the UN's decision on whether it does or does not deploy peacekeepers to conflict zones. I argue that UN peacekeeping deployment and non-deployment are mainly driven by the relationship of the P5 members and the international political environment; when the preferences of the P5 members are aligned, peacekeepers are more likely to get sent to conflict zones. When there is significant discord amongst the P5, as was the case through much of the Cold War, U.N. peacekeeping missions are much less likely. Although there are factors that make P5 members more likely to want a peacekeeping mission in a given conflict zone, these desires are often overridden by veto power bargaining dynamics within the UNSC. Further, I argue that discord amongst the P5 not only makes peacekeeping missions less likely, it also makes it less likely that they will contribute their own troops to a mission if one has been approved. Lastly, I posit the hypotheses that two unexamined characteristics of a conflict area have an effect on the rate of peacekeeping deployment: P5 proximity to a conflict area and prior P5 military involvement in the conflict.

Although a considerable amount of research has been done regarding peacekeeping missions [1, 10, 11, 24] and UNSC dynamics [27, 31, 20], as of yet these two fields have yet to be considered in concert. That is, researchers have investigated institutional discord within the group of P5 and also what sorts of conflicts receive peacekeepers, but not how the institutional dynamics of the UNSC may play a large part in the decision to deploy forces. This

article acts as a bridge of these two streams of literature and thereby provides a more comprehensive explanation of peacekeeping deployment.

Using UNGA voting data combined with conflict data, I construct empirical models to test my theory and I find support for the central hypothesis, which suggests that patterns in UN peacekeeping mission deployment can be traced back to UNSC agreement or discord and the state of the international political environment. When discord amongst the P5 is high, peacekeeping missions are considerably less likely to be deployed. I also find support for the secondary hypothesis that prior P5 involvement in the conflict makes it more likely that the UN will send a peacekeeping mission. After outlining the extant literature, I go on to describe the research design, the model, and then the empirical results. Finally, I discuss further avenues of research and implications from the results.

Chapter 2

Extant Literature

In the five years following the end of the Cold War, the UN deployed 20 peacekeeping missions, nearly a third of all the missions sent in its 65+ year history. The rapid up-tick in deployment was, unsurprisingly, accompanied by a similar growth in the amount of research dedicated to identifying and understanding trends in peacekeeping. Chief amongst the questions examined was which conflicts receive UN peacekeepers and which do not.

The answer to the question is important not only for policy but also for the study of peacekeeping more broadly. Peacekeepers getting deployed to systematically “easy” cases, that is, post-conflict zones which are, *ceteris paribus*, less likely to fall back into war, would lead us to overstate the effect of peacekeepers as their presence would be spurious to continued peace. There would be a selection effect of the cases that receive the “treatment” of peacekeeping forces. Conversely, if peacekeepers are, as the folk theorem goes, “sent where they are needed,” meaning difficult cases where the prospects of peace are slim, empirical findings would actually understate their efficacy. Despite the importance that a theory of where peacekeepers get sent bears on the reliability of any conclusions drawn as to their effectiveness, the field has yet to

reach a consensus. I believe that this is due to the fact that prior research has yet to consider the decision to send peacekeepers through the lens of relational dynamics among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Existing explanations for peacekeeping deployment trends range from European regional favoritism [14] to democracy promotion [1]. These theories also vary in their focus on the characteristics of the target state [10, 11], the international system [24], and the sending agency [14]. However, as mentioned previously, as of yet there is not a consensus on which factors are driving UN peacekeeping deployment. Two issues, one theoretical and one empirical, help explain the dearth of robust findings.

The assertion that UN peacekeeping missions largely mirror great power preferences is by no means a new theory. In reality, it is nested within the popular folk theorem of the larger literature that the United Nations is no more than an institutionalized opportunity for the great powers, most notably the P5, to exercise control over the international system [7, 29, 3, 13]. Recent literature even suggests that P5 members bribe non-permanent members of the Security Council with aid in order to secure votes for their preferred policies [23, 4]. But if it is the case that the deployment of peacekeepers is simply a reflection of the interest or importance that members of the P5 give to the conflict, how do we capture this interest? Researchers have used a number of concepts and proxies to attempt to capture this interest. For instance, Gilligan and Stedman [14] employ two commonly-employed proxies, former colonial status and trade flows, to test the theory that UN peacekeeping interventions

are driven chiefly by P5 interests. Similarly, Fortna [11] uses former colonial status as a proxy for great power interests. Gilligan and Stedman as well as Fortna argue that there may be a sense of responsibility that colonial powers feel for their former colonial holdings and this would make them more likely to push for peacekeepers. Additionally, several studies [14, 3] posit that trade flows between conflict states and P5 members can capture great power interest; if a P5 member has “skin in the game” economically, it would be more interested in the stability of a conflict zone. However, it is important to note that although the analyses above consider why the P5 would be interested in bringing peace to a conflict zone, they do not examine how the organization of the UNSC facilitates or prevents deployment. More specifically, do permanent members use their veto power, as well as the threat of a veto, to prevent peacekeeper deployment?

Although substantial research has been done regarding the unique veto situation in the UNSC and how it affects policy outcomes [32, 31] as well as how UNSC blessing affects the legitimacy of state actions [16], no systematic study has been undertaken regarding how preferences within the Security Council affect peacekeeper deployment. This seems particularly salient given that from 1946 to 1990, 279 vetoes were issued by P5 members on issues voted upon by the UNSC, whereas from 1990 to 1998 this number shrank to only eight. This suggests that while it is necessary to consider what factors may interest a P5 member in pushing for peacekeepers, a large piece of the puzzle is missing if one does not account for whether fellow P5 members would support (or at least

not veto) the mission. As a starting point, Voeten [31] analyzes what he terms the “outside option” in UNSC approval of the use of force in international conflicts. Using a formal model, he argues that there is a strong correlation between the preferences of the P5 and the bargaining space available to the actors. When there is major discord in the UNSC and preferences vary widely among the P5, the bargaining space is very small and no actor will push for the authorized use of force. The fact that states can exercise the “outside option” of carrying out military action with allies or organizations (such as NATO) other than the UN widens the bargaining space and allows for cooperation within the UNSC.

While the policy space differs in that Voeten examines the use of force and my analysis focuses on peacekeeping, the issue of preference discrepancy within the UNSC is helpful. Voeten’s results show that, as intuition might suggest, discord within the UNSC largely precludes cooperation of the P5 members. This provides a useful framework with which to consider how the relationship of the major powers within the P5 facilitate or prevent peacekeeping deployment.

Chapter 3

Theory

Peacekeeping and the Global Order

I argue that ultimately trends in the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions are a story of great power politics, more specifically the relational dynamics of permanent members of the UN Security Council. Recent research [11, 10] lends support to the claim that peacekeeping forces are, indeed, effective in bringing about and keeping peace. Assuming this to be the case, the UN deploys peacekeeping forces in order to restore and maintain stability by preventing future conflict. However, given that since the founding of the UN the majority of conflicts have not received peacekeepers, clearly we must consider what would prevent peacekeeping deployment. I argue that when the preferences of the P5 are very misaligned, peacekeeping missions are less likely. I also consider secondary hypotheses of the characteristics of a conflict that would increase or depress P5 interest in sending peacekeeping missions. However, before fully expanding upon the theory, it is necessary to establish the definition of “peacekeeping” that is used in this paper.

What is Peacekeeping?

As this project focuses specifically on UN peacekeepers, which make up the majority of peacekeeping missions deployed to conflict zones, I attempted to pinpoint the UN's own definition. Oddly, this is surprisingly difficult, with official documents explaining what peacekeeping does but not what it *is*. Therefore, I combine different facets of UN definitions of “peacekeeping” to conceptualize it as such: peacekeeping is a military UN mission that provides the security and political peacebuilding support to help states make transition from conflict to peace. Not all UN peacekeeping missions involve the use of troops and instead focus on aspects such as facilitating political processes or monitoring elections. However, similar to previous work [6], I categorize this as peacebuilding and instead look solely at missions involving military and police personnel. One clear theoretical reason for this division and conceptualization is that missions involving troops are, typically, both more costly and more risky to the personnel involved. Because individual donor states provide the troops and resources necessary to the UN, these higher costs and risks should indicate greater buy-in on the part of the U.N. That is, military missions are riskier and costlier, meaning that these types of missions indicate greater importance to the U.N., especially the P5.

Veto Power and UNSC Discord

It is important to note that given a conflict, while a P5 member may have a strong desire to send U.N. peacekeepers it cannot unilaterally do so

and is constrained by the nature of the veto system within the U.N. Security Council. As article 23 of the UN charter outlines, the Security Council is made up of 15 members, five of which are non-permanent, meaning that they are elected by the General Assembly to serve a two year term. The five permanent members, the so-called P5, are the major power victors of World War II: the United States, China, Russia, France, and the UK. In order to pass, a resolution in the UNSC must have at least nine votes. Importantly, all five permanent members have veto power over a vote; a resolution cannot pass if any one of the P5 casts a dissenting vote.¹

I argue that this veto power of the P5 within the Security Council plays the chief role in whether or not peacekeepers get sent. When the preferences of the permanent members are more similar overall, we should expect to see more peacekeeping missions deployed. This is due to the veto power of any single member as well as the implicit threat that this veto power carries. Similar to the theory outlined by Voeten [31] above regarding UN approval of military action by a state, the wide variation of preferences drastically shrinks the bargaining space (in this case, an agreement on peacekeeping deployment).

Though with five members on the Security Council there is possibility of discord between more than just two actors, by and large the preference disparity is clearest between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially over particularly salient issues in the Cold War such as the Berlin Crisis

¹A resolution can still pass given votes of abstention from P5 members.

and the Cuban Missile Crisis. As Fravel [12] notes, though China has objected to operations initiated in the past by the United States, most notably in Haiti, Iraq, and the Balkans, it has established a precedent of abstaining from contentious votes. France generally supports peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions with generous support of troops and resources², with the highest profile push-back being during the crisis in Bosnia[26].

For much of the history of the UN, then, discord within the Security Council has revolved around disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Affinity scores from UNGA voting patterns corroborate this story, with preference disparity between the superpowers being greatest immediately surrounding important historical events such as the Berlin Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the early stages of Soviet military action in Afghanistan.

It is these wide gaps in preferences that best explain peacekeeping deployment trends. Mistrust during periods of heightened tension leads P5 members to believe that UN peacekeeping missions are not being used to foment peace, but rather achieve geopolitical goals. Thus, discord amongst the members of the P5 and the institutional arrangement of their veto power makes agreement on peacekeeping missions makes their deployment less likely.

Hypothesis 1. *UN peacekeepers are more (less) likely to get sent when preferences amongst the P5 are (not) aligned*

²See [19] for data on specific troop contributions to UN missions by country and by year.

However, we should expect P5 discord to affect not only the likelihood of a mission, but also the makeup of it as well. The voluntary nature of UN peacekeeping missions means that when the UNSC votes to approve a mission, it also proposes a number of peacekeepers for that mission. However, UN members are under no obligation to volunteer troops. The UN does not have its own standing force and draws all of the troops it deploys from forces voluntarily proportioned by UN members. Thus, even though a P5 member may abstain from a vote or vote to support a mission, it need not necessarily deploy its own troops. I argue that discord not only makes missions less likely, it makes P5 troop contributions to missions that *do* get approved less likely.

The narrative here is chiefly one between the United States and the Soviet Union and also U.S.-Russian relations in the mid-1990's. Though all five members of the P5 abstained at one point or another during the Cold War on votes of peacekeeping mission, the Soviet Union did so much more often than others (six abstentions versus no more than one for any other member.) In the mid-1990's, with a surge of anti-Western rhetoric and sentiment, U.S.-Russian relations were once again strained, but the Russian Federation continued the Soviet trend of abstaining from UNSC votes. This would indicate that there are some missions that P5 members do not necessarily want to support, but do not feel strongly enough to veto. While this trade-off between vetoing and abstaining undoubtedly deserves its own analysis, for the purposes of this paper I simply hypothesize that given that a peacekeeping mission has passed, discord amongst the P5 affects individual member contributions.

Hypothesis 2. *Individual members of the P5 are more (less) likely to contribute to UN peacekeeping missions when preferences amongst the P5 are (not) aligned*

Secondary Hypotheses: Conflict-Specific Characteristics

While the above theory explains the major historical trends in peacekeeping deployment, I also briefly discuss two characteristics that are specific to a conflict that also affect the rate of missions. While the list of possible characteristics may be long, I choose to focus on two and do so for two reasons. First of all, both have been largely ignored in the literature as points of interest for P5 members. Secondly, and more importantly, I believe that these conflict characteristics give leverage and interesting insight into the question of when members of the P5 have enough of a vested interest in a conflict to press for peacekeepers.³

The first of these conflict-specific characteristics is *geographic proximity*. I propose that great powers take it upon themselves to maintain stability in their regions. Whether it be through economic or coercive means, the permanent five police their own geographical neighborhoods and avoid UN intervention on their backdoor. For instance, the United States prefers to help resolve conflicts and maintain order in Central America and China would rather do the same in East Asia than have the U.N. become involved. Two

³Keeping in line with the literature, I do include in the appendix models including the standard measures for P5 interest, namely economic ties and a previous colonial history. This is discussed at greater length in the results section.

obvious reasons for this hesitance come to mind. First of all, P5 members may simply dislike the prospect of having foreign troops near their borders, especially if some of those troops come from a rival state. This would be especially true at the height of the Cold War, as will be covered below. Secondly, and relatedly, P5 members are more likely to prevent peacekeeping missions from being deployed in their geographic neighborhood in order to maintain their own political and economic sovereignty as well as influence over the area. This is specifically referenced by Fravel [12], who argues that China considers peacekeeping as “immical to its interest because [aspects of it] infringe on national sovereignty.” Believing that the great powers are hesitant to allow UN peacekeepers nearby, I posit the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3. *UN peacekeepers are less (more) likely to get sent to conflict zones near (far from) permanent members of the UNSC*

Another conflict-specific characteristic is *previous military involvement* by a P5 member in the conflict itself. Two points are noteworthy here. First, the state’s involvement in the conflict indicates that it has significant interest in the outcome of the conflict and is a stakeholder in this outcome. If this were not the case, the P5 member would not have become involved in the conflict in the first place. Secondly, given that war is costly, both in terms of human lives and materiel, involvement means that the state has already spent significant resources on the conflict. Even small amounts of troops imply a large cost on an outside intervener into a civil war. The P5 member prefers peace after the

war but would also prefer that this peace come without additional cost on top of those paid during the conflict. In other words, the state that has already intervened prefers to free-ride on the public good of post-conflict peace rather than pay the brunt of the costs. By involving UN peacekeepers, the state can have a higher likelihood of long-term peace without assuming all of the cost itself. Therefore, I generate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4. *UN peacekeepers are more likely to get sent to conflicts that had prior military involvement by a P5 member*

Key Assumption

The theory outlined above is undergirded by one chief assumption and that is that states believe peacekeeping to be effective in keeping peace. I do not make claims as to the efficacy of peacekeeping or examine why missions *are* or are *not* effective.⁴ However, I do assume that states believe missions to be effective in preventing further war. This assumption seems tenable given that the historical trend of peacekeeping is towards more missions, not less. Theories without this assumption would need to explain why peacekeeping is becoming more common although states do not believe it to be effective in its stated task.

⁴See [10] for possible causal mechanisms as to why peacekeeping helps keep peace

Why the UN?

Lastly, it is worth asking why in this project I focus mainly on UN peacekeeping and do not consider peacekeeping more generally (ie. in regional IGO's, unilateral interventions, etc.). I do so for three fundamental reasons. First of all, the majority of peacekeeping missions have been sent under UN auspices. Although there has been an uptick in the number of regional and even unilateral peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping remains the most common. I believe it is important to be able to explain the most "typical" cases of peacekeeping before moving on to theorize about less common cases. Secondly, there are theoretical grounds for analyzing UN peacekeeping as distinct from general peacekeeping. The bargaining process is different when considering unilateral, regional IOs, and UN peacekeeping, as I have outlined above. Unilateral missions require no institutional bargaining at the international level. Regional IOs lack the bargaining dynamic of the great powers veto power within the UNSC. Therefore, we may need to separate out the three different phenomena rather than considering where peacekeepers go in general. Thirdly, I focus on the UN because of data issues. More and finer-grain data exists for UN peacekeeping missions as opposed to regional IO and unilateral missions. This fine-grain data allow for more analytical leverage on answering the questions of who sends peacekeepers and why they are sent in the first place.

Chapter 4

Research Design

Data and Estimation

For the analyses, I utilize two different datasets. Firstly, I use PRIO's Armed Conflict Dataset, which covers both intrastate and interstate conflicts from 1946-2008. I aggregate intrastate and interstate conflicts together because my theory of P5 discord and the desire to achieve peace makes no distinction between intrastate and interstate conflicts.¹ The data cover all years of possible UN peacekeeping and allow me to focus on my theoretical story of peacekeeping during and after conflict. As I do not look at temporal variation within missions or conflicts, the unit of analysis is simply conflict. I limit the analysis to cases of conflict with at least 1,000 cumulative battle deaths, leaving 223 observations of intrastate and interstate conflict. In addition, I have merged in data from COW regarding alliance relationships. Right-censored observations, meaning either conflicts or peacekeeping missions that are ongoing in the data, have been dropped from the set.

To test troop contribution trends, I use a new dataset from Kathman

¹Though UN peacekeepers get sent more often to civil conflict versus intrastate war, some notable intrastate conflicts that receive UN missions include the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, several missions to the Balkans in the 1990's, and after the Yom Kippur War.

[19] that records personnel commitment to UN peacekeeping missions from 1990-2010.² Though the data are disaggregated at the mission level to show individual country contributions by month and by personnel type, I have collapsed the data to look at yearly trends in keeping with the yearly analysis of P5 discord. These data allow me to capture whether individual states contribute to missions and include variables for distance from a P5 member as well as P5 member involvement in the conflict. In this case, the unit of analysis is mission-state-year.

To test my hypotheses, I employ binary logit models. This is fitting due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables, as the UN either deploys peacekeepers to a conflict or it does not and individual members either contribute to a mission or they do not. Given the relatively small number of conflicts and relatively large number of peacekeeping missions, the analysis of whether a conflict receives peacekeepers does not warrant a rare events logit. The same is true for the model analyzing state contributions to missions. Individual P5 states contribute to peacekeeping missions in 54% of the observations.

²Though I would prefer a more extensive dataset in order to evaluate possible differences in trends between the Cold War and post-Cold War era, one virtue of the sample is that it covers the majority of UN peacekeeping missions and there still remains significant variation in P5 discord during this period

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in my analysis is the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission during or after a conflict. By 2008, there had been 67 UN peacekeeping missions deployed around the world. However, many of these missions were simply continuations of previous missions and are different chiefly in name only.³ In order to prevent overstating the distinct number of UN peacekeeping missions sent, I code the dependent variable as 1 only if it represents a fundamentally new mission. Operationally, this means that at least one year has passed since the end of a previous mission in the same country. Consistent with the literature, I do not consider missions in which no troops were on the ground, such as the mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) in 2002. Missions of these type are classified as “peacebuilding” missions and do not focus on bringing an end to conflict or the enforcement of ceasefires or treaties but rather the building of institutions and infrastructure. Given this operationalization, there are 47 cases of peacekeeping in the dataset out of a total N of 223 cases. I also do not examine the specific type or makeup of the mission but instead consider it a simple binary variable.⁴ I draw these data

³A good example of this is Angola receiving three “different” missions: UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II, and UNAVEM III. While the organizational structure of the mission changed, it is not necessarily correct to say that Angola received three distinct peacekeeping missions.

⁴Although some in the literature divide out peacekeeping into different types, from lightly-armed monitors to heavily-armed enforcement missions, for this analysis I choose not to make a similar distinction. My theory focuses on when P5 members would and would not push for peacekeeping forces, not the level of commitment once the missions has been approved.

from UN sources.⁵

In the case of the second group of models, I use a binary dependent variable that captures if a state did or did not send troops to a UN mission during a given mission year. The “troop” variable captures troops, police, or armed observers.

Explanatory Variables

The major explanatory variable of interest is a measure of discord between the great powers and comes from Voeten’s [33] UN general assembly voting data. The variable captures the difference in voting behaviors relative to the United States. To operationalize the discord measure I construct a variable that measures the greatest difference in the ideal points between any two of the P5 members in a given year.⁶ Larger values for the score indicate greater disagreement between P5 members, as captured by United Nations General Assembly voting behaviors. For much of the data, this is simply the difference in ideal points between the United States and the Soviet Union, though in a handful of cases the most opposed states are France and the Soviet Union. In order to examine how recent discord affects current decisions to send peacekeepers, I lag the variable one year. Based on my hypotheses, I expect the coefficient on this variable to be negative.

⁵For more detailed explanations of mission types, see Fortna [10] and Doyle and Sambanis [6]

⁶See [33] for a comprehensive explanation of how ideal points are calculated and measured.

To examine my secondary hypotheses, I utilize two explanatory variables. The first is *distance* of the UN mission country from the nearest permanent member of the UNSC. This measure is designed to test the theory that great powers do not wish to have peacekeepers on their geographical backdoor. For the statistical analysis, I take the log of the distance from the two capitals in miles. My expectation is that as the distance between the capitals goes up, the likelihood of U.N. peacekeeping will go up, as well.

The next explanatory variable is a dummy measure for *prior involvement* in the conflict by a member of the P5. As outlined in the theory section, I hypothesize that conflicts with prior P5 involvement are more likely to see UN peacekeepers because the intervener attempts to outsource the peacekeeping process and have other states shoulder the load. The variable is coded as 1 when the PRIO data report a P5 member as a side in the conflict and 0 otherwise.

Controls and Robustness

For robustness checks, I run a number of models that include control variables that are often cited in the peacekeeping literature as having an effect on deployment patterns. The first is a control variable to capture the presence of a *formal alliance* between the country experiencing conflict and any P5 member. It is conceivable that P5 members are more likely to push for peacekeepers if they have a formal alliance with one of the parties in the conflict. For interstate conflict, I code the variable as 1 if any of the parties

in the conflict have a formal alliance, meaning non-aggression or defense pact, with a P5 member. I draw this data from COW. I also add a control variable for commonly used proxy for P5 interest: colonial history. Colonial history is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the conflict country was a colony of a P5 member. Many have argued [10, 11, 24, 13] that a colonial history makes a colonizer more likely to intervene on the behalf of their former colonies. In the second round of models, I include a dummy variable for “lootable resources,”⁷ which has also been cited as a possible source of P5 interest in a conflict [25, 5, 14].

⁷The main resources covered in the [22] dataset are timber, oil, and diamonds

Chapter 5

Results

Table 5.1 shows the results of the first group of logit models, which measure the effect of the explanatory variables on whether or not peacekeeping missions get sent to conflict zones. In the first model specification, involving only the explanatory variables of interest, all three coefficients demonstrate the expected sign and the measures for P5 discord and previous P5 involvement both reach statistical significance. The relatively low p value on the distance coefficient (0.12) provides some support for the secondary hypothesis that peacekeepers are less likely to be sent to conflicts that are near P5 members.

Two interesting results when including the control variables. First of all, the “colony” coefficients across the different specifications do not support the story that former colonies of P5 members are more likely to receive peacekeepers. The colony measure never approaches statistical significance, suggesting that there is not a robust relationship between colonial history and peacekeeping missions. Secondly, the sign on all of the specifications for the P5 alliance measure are actually negative, suggesting that states with formal alliances with P5 members are actually less likely to receive peacekeeping missions. This finding is most robust when aggregating the different types of

Table 5.1: Likelihood a Mission is Sent

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
P5 discord	-0.770* (0.334)	-0.772* (0.334)	-0.744* (0.338)
Distance	0.659 (0.432)	0.639 (0.442)	0.403 (0.453)
Prior P5 Intervention	1.221* (0.512)	1.206* (0.518)	1.016 (0.535)
Colonial History		-0.073 (0.361)	-0.144 (0.367)
P5 Alliance			-1.003* (0.393)
Constant	-3.718 (3.776)	-3.495 (3.924)	-1.239 (4.049)
N	203	203	203
chi2	10.166	10.207	17.298

*p<0.05, **p<.0.01, ***p<0.001

alliances, but as seen in the models found in the section on robustness checks, the sign is consistent across alternate specifications.

Overall, empirical results across different model specifications lend support to the hypotheses that P5 discord and prior involvement play a part in peacekeeping decisions. The hypothesis that conflicts nearer to P5 members are less likely to receive peacekeepers has some empirical support across specifications but these coefficients do not reach statistical significance.

Looking at the second group of models in Table 5.2, which examines the affect that the explanatory variables have on if a P5 state sends peacekeepers to a mission in a given year, the results are inconclusive. Though the coefficients for P5 discord and involvement take on the expected signs, neither reach statistical significance. Interestingly, the sign for the distance measure is

negative, though it also does not reach statistical significance. In this case, all three coefficients have p values above 0.25. This is true for the alternate specifications including control variables for colonial history and lootable resources (models 2-4). Though both are widely discussed in the literature as a source of P5 interest in a conflict, the results do not provide evidence that lootable resources or a colonial history are related with P5 members' willingness to deploy peacekeeping troops to a UN mission.

Table 5.2: Likelihood of P5 Members Contributing Troops

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
P5 Discord	-0.230 (0.196)	-0.236 (0.199)	-0.219 (0.201)	-0.225 (0.204)
Distance	-0.210 (0.218)	-0.213 (0.222)	-0.197 (0.220)	-0.200 (0.224)
Prior P5 Intervention	0.269 (0.225)	0.267 (0.225)	0.262 (0.226)	0.261 (0.226)
Colonial History		-0.106 (0.516)		-0.105 (0.515)
Lootable Resources			0.191 (0.503)	0.191 (0.504)
Constant	2.253 (1.918)	2.342 (2.090)	1.993 (2.041)	2.082 (2.225)
N	1500	1500	1500	1500
chi2	3.587	3.612	3.993	4.007

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Robustness Checks

I employ a number of additional models for robustness checks and alternative specifications. First of all, though the P5 discord variable is intended to capture the major international systemic factors that differ between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, I run a separate model for each time

period, with the results noted in table 5.3. For the Cold War period, the coefficients for P5 discord and the geography both take on the expected signs, but along with the P5 prior involvement coefficient, do not approach statistical significance (all have p values above 0.3).

Table 5.3: Likelihood a Mission is Sent: Cold War and Post-Cold War

Variables	Cold War	Post-Cold War
P5 Discord	-0.806 (0.801)	0.036 (0.626)
Distance	-0.406 (0.691)	1.945** (0.729)
P5 Prior Involvement	-0.397 (0.880)	3.643*** (1.104)
Constant	5.293 (6.686)	-17.419** (6.707)
N	103	100
chi2	1.614	18.102

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

In the Post-Cold War period, there is strong support for hypotheses 3 and 4, that geographical proximity lessens the likelihood of deployment and prior involvement by a P5 member increases the likelihood of UN peacekeepers. However, my chief hypothesis dealing with P5 discord receives very little support. This highlights the chief trend in the data, that the post-Cold War period has the majority of the peacekeeping missions but not as much variation in the P5 discord measure.

I also investigate whether the type or number of P5 alliances has any systematic relationship with the deployment of UN peacekeepers. In table 5.4 I disaggregate the COW measure of alliance to be a defense pact (model 1)

or a formal treaty of nonaggression (model 2). Model 3 uses a measure for the number of P5 alliances that the conflict state has. That is, if the civil war is occurring in Burma, how many states of the P5 have formal alliances with Burma?

Table 5.4: Likelihood a Mission is Sent: Alliances

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
P5 Discord	-0.773* (0.334)	-0.751* (0.334)	-0.776* (0.337)
Distance	0.634 (0.445)	0.384 (0.459)	0.204 (0.478)
Prior P5 Involvement	1.209* (0.519)	0.939 (0.537)	0.839 (0.550)
Colonial History	-0.076 (0.362)	-0.194 (0.370)	-0.240 (0.376)
Defense Pact	-0.044 (0.462)		
Nonaggression		-0.746 (0.421)	
Number of P5 Allies			-0.742* (0.326)
Constant	-3.441 (3.966)	-1.138 (4.125)	0.591 (4.328)
N	203	203	203
chi2	10.216	13.540	16.070

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Once again, the P5 discord takes on the expected sign across all three specifications. Model 1, including only defense pacts, also maintains statistical significance for prior P5 involvement. The coefficients, as in previous models, have the expected positive sign but we cannot draw any concrete conclusions due to the large p values. Interestingly, the number of P5 allies that a conflict state has seems to actually lessen the likelihood of mission deployment. It may be that this is capturing the same phenomena as the consistent findings above

that prior P5 involvement makes peacekeeping more likely. That is, it may be that the greater the number of P5 formal alliances, the more likely that a member will intervene in the conflict. Once this occurs, the intervener pushes for peacekeeping in order to share the cost burden.

Chapter 6

Discussion

What explains UN peacekeeping trends? I argue that it is ultimately a story of great power interest and the international political environment. I see strong empirical support for my main hypothesis, that the chief driver of peacekeeping deployment decisions in the UNSC is the state of the international system. Disagreements on preferences amongst the P5 make it considerably less likely that peacekeepers are deployed. When discord is high (such as during much of the Cold War), missions are less likely. I also find support for one of my two secondary hypotheses: if a permanent member has intervened in the conflict previously, UN peacekeepers are more likely to get sent, suggesting that the P5 may want to avoid further costs on top of those incurred during the war and pass on the costs of peacekeeping to the UN.

I find that distance also has some effect on whether or not missions are sent. That is, the P5 avoid having UN peacekeepers in their backyard, whether it be due to concerns of sovereignty or a desire to police their own neighborhoods. Despite past theories, I find no empirical support for the assertion that P5 colonies are more likely to receive peacekeepers and varied results on the alliance measures.

This project is important for two key reasons. First of all, it highlights the importance that the state of the international system plays in UN peacekeeping decisions. The results suggest that researchers should not focus solely on the characteristics of conflicts or on interveners in order to understand deployment trends. The organizational setup of the UNSC and the veto power of all P5 members play a very large part in the decision to send troops. Secondly, as mentioned previously, the factors regarding when peacekeepers are sent have strong implications for the answer of how effective peacekeepers are at keeping peace. Unless P5 discord and prior intervention by one of the members combine to create systematically “easy” cases of peacekeeping, there is little reason to think that recent findings of peacekeeping effectiveness [10] suffer from a selection effect.

With that being said, there is more work to be done in the study of UN mission selection. First of all, while the UN affinity scores provide a rough idea of the great power environment in a given year, finer grain analysis may help unlock temporal variations within (and after) the Cold War. Relatedly, how have trends in abstention votes changed during this time period? Descriptive statistics indicate that China and Russia both began abstaining from UNSC votes much more frequently since the end of the Cold War. This trend coincides with a jump in the number of approved missions. What explains when a P5 member abstains versus when it vetoes and undesired peacekeeping mission? Secondly, while there seems to be a robust relationship between prior P5 intervention and UN peacekeeping, the causal link there is by no means

clear. A better understanding of why P5 involvement leads to UN peacekeeping would allow researchers to better understand why peacekeepers do and do not get sent.

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Vita

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